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Abstract
We present APHRODITE, an architecture designed to reduce false posi-
tives in network intrusion-detection systems. APHRODITE works by detecting
anomalies in the outgoing traﬃc, and by correlating them with the alerts raised
by the NIDS analyzing the incoming traﬃc. Benchmarks show a substantial
reduction of false positives between 50% and 100%.
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1 Introduction
Network intrusion-detection systems (NIDSes) are considered an eﬀective second
line of defense against network-based attacks directed at computer systems [5, 11],
and – due to the increasing severity and likelihood of such attacks – are employed
in almost all large-scale IT infrastructures [2].
The Achille’s heel of NIDSes lies in the large number of false positives (i.e.,
false attacks) that occur [27]: practitioners [23, 32] as well as researchers [3, 8, 14]
observe that it is common for a NIDS to raise thousands of mostly false alerts per
day. Julisch [15] states that up to 99% of total alerts may not be related to real
security issues.
False positives are a universal problem as they aﬀect both signature and anomaly-
based intrusion-detection systems [4]. A high rate of false alerts is – also according
to Axelsson [3] – the limiting factor for the performance of an intrusion-detection
system. False alerts often cause an overload for IT personnel [23], who must verify
every single alert, a task that is not only labor intensive but error prone too [9].
Indeed, a high false positive rate can even be exploited by attackers to overload IT
personnel, thereby lowering the defenses of the IT infrastructure.
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1Contribution of this paper Our thesis is that one of the main reasons why
NIDSes show a high false positive rate is that they do not correlate input with
output traﬃc.
To demonstrate this, we have developed APHRODITE (Architecture for false
Positive Reduction): an innovative architecture for reducing the false positive rate of
any NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based). APHRODITE consists of an output
anomaly detector and a correlation engine (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: APHRODITE architecture
Architecture We assume the presence of a NIDS monitoring the incoming traﬃc
of the system. The main idea of our approach is simple: a successful attack often
causes an anomaly in the output of the system. For instance, a successful SQL
Injection attack [41] against a web-based system would typically cause the system
to output e.g. SQL tables rather than the usual web pages. Taking advantage of
this, APHRODITE works as follows: when the input NIDS raises an alert, the
correlation engine checks whether the communication that raised this alert causes
an anomaly in the output too (detected by the output anomaly detector). In this
case, the alert is considered a true positive and APHRODITE forwards it to the
IT professionals, otherwise, it is discarded as a false positive. (There are a few
exceptions to this behaviour, taking into account e.g., the possible absence of output
or the quality/quantity of alerts raised by the input NIDS, we explain this in Section
3.)
2Since nowadays attacks against connection-less protocols are less common (see
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [38] (CVE) database for detailed statis-
tics), we have designed APHRODITE with the explicit goal of reducing false pos-
itives when monitoring network services based on the TCP protocol (although it
can be easily adapted to work with the UDP protocol); furthermore these attacks
can be detected by well-tuned signature-based systems (see Section 2.1 for further
information about tuning).
To our best knowledge, APHRODITE is the ﬁrst proposed solution to reduce
false positives that:
• works in combination with both signature-based and anomaly-based systems
• operates in a completely automatic way after a quick setup, avoiding any
further human involvement
We have benchmarked APHRODITE in combination with the signature-based
NIDS Snort [35, 36], as well as APHRODITE in combination with the anomaly-
based NIDS POSEIDON [6]. We have carried out the benchmarks both on the
common DARPA 1999 data set [21] as well as on a private data set. In 7 out of 8
cases, our benchmarks show a reduction of false positives between 50% and 100%,
that is a better result than whose of the unique leading competitor [33] (always using
benchmarks on a public data set).
Structure of the paper This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
introduce intrusion-detection systems and the problems related to false positives.
Section 3 reports the system architecture and its properties. In Section 4 we report
summary results of our benchmarks (detailed results are presented in Appendix A).
In Section 5 we discuss related work. Finally, in Section 6 we draw our conclusions
and set the course for further developments. In Appendix B we report the pseudo
code of APHRODITE.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the concepts used in the rest of the paper and we
explain in a more detailed way than in the introduction how false positives arise in
signature and anomaly-based systems.
2.1 Signature-Based Systems
Signature-based systems (SBSes), e.g. Snort [35, 36], are based on pattern-recogn-
ition techniques: the NIDS contains a known-attack signature database and tries
to match these signatures against the analyzed data. When a match is found, an
alert is raised. A speciﬁc signature must be developed oﬀ-line, and then loaded into
the database before the system can begin to detect a particular intrusion. One of
the disadvantages of SBSes is that they can detect only known attacks: new attacks
3will be unnoticed till the system is updated, creating a window of opportunity for
attackers (and aﬀecting the NIDS completeness and accuracy [10, 11]). Although
this is considered acceptable for detecting attacks to e.g. the OS, it makes them
less suitable for protecting web-based services, because of their ad hoc and dynamic
nature.
False Positives in Signature-Based Systems SBSes raise an alert every time
that traﬃc matches one of the signatures loaded into the system. Consider for exam-
ple the path traversal attack, which allows to access ﬁles, directories, and commands
residing outside the (given) web document root directory.
To detect these attacks many SBSes (using a out-of-the-box conﬁguration) raise
an alert each time they identify the pattern “../” in the incoming traﬃc. Unfortu-
nately, this pattern is often present in legal traﬃc, and this causes SBSes to raise
a high number of false alerts. These false alerts can be avoided by deactivating the
speciﬁc rule. On the other hand this prevents the NIDS from detecting this sort of
attacks.
A good deal of the false positives raised by a SBS can be suppressed by a tun-
ing activity: this activity, based on deactivation of unneeded signatures, requires a
thorough analysis of the environment by qualiﬁed IT personnel. Finally, to remain
eﬀective, SBSes require a recurrent conﬁguration updating to reﬂect changes in the
environment: new vulnerabilities are discovered daily, new signatures are released
regularly, and systems may be patched, thereby (possibly adding or) removing vul-
nerabilities.
2.2 Anomaly-Based Systems
Anomaly-based systems (ABSes) use a statistical method to monitor network traﬃc.
Intuitively, an ABS works as follows: in the setup phase, the ABS builds a model
of the normal network traﬃc. Later, in the operational phase, the ABS ﬂags as an
attack any input that signiﬁcantly deviates from the model. To determine when an
input signiﬁcantly deviates from the model the ABS uses a distance function and a
threshold set by user: when the distance between the input and the model exceeds
the threshold, the alarm is raised.
The ABSes main advantage is that they can detect zero-day attacks: novel at-
tacks can be detected as soon as they take place. Clearly, because of their statistical
nature ABSes are bound to raise a number of false positives, and the value of the
threshold actually determines a compromise between the number of false positives
and the number of false negatives the IT security personnel is willing to accept.
False Positives in Anomaly-Based Systems The high false positive rate is
generally cited as one of the main disadvantages of anomaly-based systems. The
value of the threshold has a direct inﬂuence on both false negative and false positive
rates [39]: a low threshold (too close to the model) yields a high number of alerts, and
therefore a low false negative rate, but a high false positive rate. On the other hand
4a high threshold yields a low number of alerts in general (therefore a high number of
false negatives, but a low number of false positives). The most commonly used tuning
procedure for ABSes is ﬁnding an optimal threshold value, i.e., the best compromise
between a low number of false negatives and a low (or acceptable) number of false
positives. This is typically carried out manually by trained IT personnel: diﬀerent
improving steps can be necessary to obtain a good balance between detection and
false positive rates.
3 Architecture
The main idea of our approach is the following: a successful attack (incident) [2]
to a system (e.g. a web service) usually produces an anomaly in the output of the
system. On the other hand, if something in the input of the system causes the NIDS
to raise an alert but does not cause the system to produce an unusual output, then
this alert is likely to be a false positive.
APHRODITE’s architecture consists of two internal and one external compo-
nents. The external component is the NIDS monitoring the incoming traﬃc. We
do not make any assumption on it other than the fact that every now and then it
raises an alert: as a matter of fact APHRODITE can work together with any kind
of NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based).
The ﬁrst internal component is the output anomaly detector (OAD), which is
actually an anomaly-based NIDS monitoring the outgoing traﬃc: the OAD refers
to a statistical model describing the normal output of the system, and ﬂags any
behaviour that signiﬁcantly deviates from the norm as the result of a possible attack.
The second internal component is the correlation engine (CE), which tracks
(using stateful-inspection [7]) and correlates alerts related to incoming traﬃc and
raised by the input NIDS with the output produced by the OAD.
APHRODITE works as follows (see Figure 1): the input NIDS monitors the
incoming traﬃc while, simultaneously, the OAD analyzes the output of network ser-
vices. When the input NIDS raises an alert, this is forwarded to the CE, together
with the information regarding the communication endpoints (i.e. source and des-
tination IP addresses, source and destination TCP ports) of the packet that raised
the alert. At this moment, the alert is not considered an incident yet (it is a pre-
alert) and is not forwarded immediately to the IT specialists. Next, the CE marks
the communication relative to the given endpoints as suspicious and waits for the
output of the OAD: if the OAD detects an anomaly in the outgoing traﬃc related
to the tracked communication, then the system considers the alert as an incident
(i.e. a true positive) and the alert is forwarded to the IT specialists for further han-
dling and countermeasure reactions, otherwise it is considered a false positive and
is discarded.
What we just described is the most common behaviour; nevertheless there exist
important exceptions to it. Namely:
1. Missing output response. If the OAD does not detect any output related
5to the pre-alert raised by the NIDS, then the pre-alert is considered an incident
and is forwarded to the IT security specialist. This is because the pre-alert
could belong to a denial of service attack against a certain network service (pre-
venting normal functioning or causing a complete stop), leading to a situation
of missing response.
Therefore, the absence of an output should be considered an anomaly in the
normal data ﬂow and must be handled accordingly to the correlation engine.
To this end, we need to set appropriate application-dependent timeouts (com-
monly a data exchange between peers take place in a short time); after their
expiration the communication can be marked as anomalous.
2. Alert magnitude. When the input NIDS is anomaly-based (as opposed to
signature-based) raised alerts can indicate the alert magnitude too: anomaly-
based NIDS compare the traﬃc to a statistical model of the traﬃc, and raise
an alert when the input exceeds a given threshold. Here, by alert magnitude we
indicate the distance between the alert-raising packet and the threshold. The
higher the alert magnitude, the more anomalous is the packet, and therefore
the more likely that it indicates an incident.
In APHRODITE when the magnitude is higher than a given value the alert
raised by the NIDS is considered an incident, even if the OAD has not detected
any anomaly in the output.
3. Number of alert-raising packets. APHRODITE takes into account the
number of anomalies regarding output traﬃc related to a single endpoint (e.g.
in the past and in the current communications) in a given time frame: this
parameter becomes particularly interesting when the input NIDS is anomaly-
based and packet-oriented, which can mark as anomalous a number of packets
belonging to the same communication.
The pseudo code of APHRODITE (the OAD and the CE) is reported in Ap-
pendix B.
3.1 The OAD
As we mentioned before, the OAD is basically an anomaly payload-based NIDS,
which monitors the output of a system rather than the input of it. In our embod-
iment we choose to use the payload-based POSEIDON [6] as the OAD. Actually,
for the OAD we could have used any anomaly-based NIDS, we chose POSEIDON
because we are familiar with it and because it gives better results than leading
competitor [6].
The fact that the OAD is anomaly-based (rather than signature-based) has
various advantages. Firstly, the OAD can adapt to the speciﬁc network environ-
ment/service; secondly it does not require the deﬁnition of new signatures to detect
anomalous output, working in an unsupervised way (at least, after the initial setup).
6Creating and maintaining a set of signatures for the outgoing traﬃc is a thorny and
labor intensive task, as these signatures would heavily depend on the local applica-
tion, and would have to be updated each time that modiﬁcations of the application
determine changes in its output content. The disadvantage of using an anomaly-
based system is that the OAD needs an extensive (though unsupervised) training
phase: a signiﬁcant amount of normal traﬃc data is needed to build an accurate
statistical model of the legal behaviour.
Setting the threshold A sw em e n t i o n e di nS e c t i o n2 . 2 ,i nA B S e sc o m p l e t e n e s s
and accuracy are intrinsically related and they are heavily inﬂuenced by the threshold
value. Here, we call completeness the ratio TP/(TP + FN)a n daccuracy the ratio
TP/(TP + FP), where TP is the number of true positives, FN is the number of
false negatives and FP is the number of false positives raised during the benchmarks.
Our experiments show that setting the threshold at 3tmax
4 , usually yields reasonably
good results; here tmax is the maximum distance between the analyzed data and the
model observed during the training phase.
4 Experiments and results
To validate our architecture, we benchmark APHRODITE in combination with the
signature-based NIDS Snort [35, 36] as well as APHRODITE in combination with
the anomaly-based NIDS POSEIDON [6]. To drive the experiments, we employ
two diﬀerent data sets. Firstly we use the DARPA 1999 data set [21]: despite
criticism [26, 22] this is a standard data for benchmarking NIDSes (e.g. [40, 33])
and it has the advantage that it allows one to duplicate experiments and to compare
diﬀerent NIDSes directly. Secondly, we benchmark the system using a private data
set. Appendix A shows detailed graphs with the benchmark results; in this section
we present the highlights.
Tests with the DARPA 1999 data set The testing environment of the DARPA
1999 data set contains several internal hosts that are attacked by both external
and internal attackers. Moreover, hosts inside the local area network are able to
conduct attacks against external hosts. In our tests, we focus on FTP, Telnet, SMTP
and HTTP protocols. There are two reasons for this. Firstly only these protocols
give us a suﬃcient number of samples we need to train the OAD, and secondly
only these protocols allow us to compare our architecture with POSEIDON, that
has been benchmarked following the same procedures (because of the large sample
set available only for these protocols). Other restrictions are applied to make the
comparison possible: we consider only inbound and outbound TCP packets that
belong to attack connections against hosts inside the network 172.016.0.0/16.
We train the OAD of APHRODITE with the data of weeks 1 and 3 (attack-
free): for each diﬀerent protocol we use a diﬀerent OAD instance. Afterward, we
test APHRODITE together with both POSEIDON and Snort using the week 4 and
75 traﬃc. In order to distinguish between true and false positives we can refer to the
attack instance table provided by the DARPA data set authors.
Table 1 reports a comparison of the detection and false positive rates of Snort
stand-alone (ﬁrst column), Snort in combination with APHRODITE (second col-
umn), POSEIDON stand-alone (third column) and POSEIDON in combination with
APHRODITE (fourth column). In both cases, APHRODITE achieves a substan-
tial improvement on the stand-alone system neither aﬀecting the detection rate nor
introducing false negatives: APHRODITE reduces the false positive amount by at
least 50% on every protocol benchamrked, except when we benchmark the Telent
protocol together with POSEIDON. In our opinion, this discrepancy is due to the
great variability of the Telnet service output. APHRODITE is not applied to SMTP
traﬃc in combination with Snort because in this case Snort raises no false positives.
Protocol Snort
Snort
+
APHRODITE
POSEIDON
POSEIDON
+
APHRODITE
HTTP
DR 59,9% 59,9% 100% 100%
FP 599 (0,069%) 5 (0,00057%) 15 (0,0018%) 0 (0,0%)
FTP
DR 31,75% 31,75% 100% 100%
FP 875 (3,17%) 317 (1,14%) 3303 (11,31%) 373 (1,35%)
Telnet
DR 26,83% 26,83% 95,12% 95,12%
FP 391 (0,041%) 6 (0,00063%) 63776 (6,72%) 56885 (5,99%)
SMTP
DR 13,3% - 100% 100%
FP 0 (0,0%) - 6476 (3,69%) 2797 (1,59%)
Table 1: Comparison between Snort stand-alone, Snort in combination with
APHRODITE, POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combination with
APHRODITE using the DARPA 1999 data set: DR stands for detection rate (attack
instance percentage), while FP is the false positive rate (packets and corresponding
percentage); APHRODITE reduces false positives by more than 50% most of the
time, being close to zero in 3 tests, without aﬀecting the detection rate.
Tests with a private data set To complete our validation, and to see how the
system behaves when trained with a data set that was not made attack-free1,w e
consider a second (private) data set we collected at the University of Twente: this is
data set B. Data was collected on a public network for 5 consecutive working days (24
hours per day), logging only TCP traﬃc directed to (and originating from) a heavy-
loaded web server (about 10 Gigabytes of total traﬃc per day). This web server hosts
several oﬃcial the department oﬃcial web sites as well as student and research staﬀ
personal web pages: thus, the traﬃc contains diﬀerent types of data such as static
and dynamically generated HTML pages and, especially in the outgoing traﬃc,
1This is useful to see how the system performs in the sub-optimal situation in which the IT
security specialist does not have the time to clean up the training data set, a situation that is likely
to occur often in practice.
8common format documents (e.g. PDF) as well as raw binary data (e.g. software
executables). We did not inject any artiﬁcial attack.
We focus on HTTP traﬃc because nowadays Internet attacks are mainly directed
to web servers and web-based applications [17]: Kruegel et al. [18] state that web-
based attacks account for 20%-30% from 1999 to 2004 in CVE entries [38]; further-
more Symantec Corporation reports that in the year 2005 web-based services have
been the third most attacked service (ranked by TCP port), and in the second-half
of the year 69% of total discovered vulnerabilities apply to web applications [37].
To train the anomaly-detection engines of both POSEIDON and the OAD on
the data set B, we simply use a snapshot of the data collected during working hours
(approximately 3 hours, 1,8 Gigabytes of data): it is widely acknowledged that
attackers prefer to conduct malicious activity during non-working hours, when the
system is usually less monitored by IT personnel. The chosen training data set has
not been pre-processed and made attack-free: it is thus possible that the model
includes some malicious activity (in this way, we can evaluate the completeness and
accuracy of the architecture in the presence of noisy data too). For the same reason,
we randomly choose a nightly snapshot (approximately 8 hours, 1,8 Gigabytes of
data) to benchmark POSEIDON stand-alone against POSEIDON in combination
with APHRODITE. Moreover, we set the threshold following the simple heuristics
discussed in Section 3.1. We classiﬁed alerts manually and detected 33 attack in-
stances in 59288 input packets: most of the attacks are XSS (Cross-site Scripting)
and SQL Injection attacks [41]. Table 2 summarizes the results we obtained.
We cannot compare APHRODITE in combination with Snort on this second
data set for the simple reason that Snort does not ﬁnd any attack to the system
(Snort raised only false alerts): by setting a high output threshold in APHRODITE
we could remove all the false positives, but this would give no indication of the
completeness and accuracy of APHRODITE.
Protocol POSEIDON
POSEIDON
+
APHRODITE
HTTP
DR 100% 100%
FP 1683 (2,83%) 774 (1,30%)
Table 2: Comparison between POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combi-
nation with APHRODITE using data set B; DR stands for detection rate (attack
instance percentage), while FP is the false positive rate (packets and correspond-
ing percentage); APHRODITE reduces false positives by more than 50% without
aﬀecting the detection rate.
95 Related work
The problem of reducing false positives has been addressed using two diﬀerent kinds
of approaches: on the one hand we have techniques for identifying true positives,
and on the other hand we have techniques for identifying false positives.
The main diﬀerence between our work and the papers described below consists
of the fact that we take into account the outgoing traﬃc of the system.
Identifying true positives Ning et al. developed a model [31] and an intrusion-
alert correlator [28] to help human analysts during the alert veriﬁcation phase. Their
work is based on the observation that most attacks consist of several related stages,
with the early stages preparing for the later ones. The authors introduce the concept
of the prerequisite of an attack, which is deﬁned as the necessary condition for
the attack to be successful. Furthermore, logical formulas are used to describe
relationships between diﬀerent attack stages, and hyper-alert correlation graphs are
employed to represent correlated alerts in an intuitive way. However, this correlation
technique is ineﬀective when attackers use a diﬀerent IP source address at each attack
step. APHRODITE uses the IP source address to relate the packets in a given single
communication and not to correlate with other communications. Ning and Cui [28]
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of this approach when applied on a small data set:
in [29, 30] the same authors present other utilities they developed to facilitate the
analysis of large sets of correlated alerts, and report some benchmarks employing
network traﬃc used during the DEFCON 8 Capture the Flag (CTF) event [12].
APHRODITE does not present the same limitations on data set size.
Lee and Stolfo [19] develop a framework based on data mining techniques, such
as sequential patterns mining and episodes rules (see Agrawal and Srikan [1] and Han
et al. [13]), to address the problem of improving attack detection while maintaining a
low false positive rate. The system works by extracting information from audit traﬃc
and building classiﬁcation models (speciﬁcally designed for certain types of intrusion)
using data mining techniques: connection features (i.e. duration, type, protocol) are
used to build a time-based traﬃc model, traﬃc features (i.e. number of connections
directed to the same host or same service in a given time frame) constitutes the
basis for a host-based traﬃc model while a content model collects content features
information (i.e. data payload, errors reported by the OS, root access attempts). The
system detects attacks combining the models and comparing them with actual traﬃc
features. Benchmarks have been conducted using the DARPA 1998 data set [20]:
detection score for diﬀerent attack typologies has a minimum value of 65% with a
false positive rate always below 0.05%. Since the authors use a diﬀerent data set,
we cannot compare directly the two approaches: we can notice that our approach
does not use information collected from the operating system hosting the monitored
network service(s), thus APHRODITE can work on-line without aﬀecting the host
performance.
10Identifying false positives Pietraszek [33] tackles the problem of reducing false
positives by introducing an alert classiﬁer system (ALAC, Adaptive Learner for
Alert Classiﬁcation) based on machine learning techniques. During the training
phase, the system classiﬁes alerts into true and false positives, by attaching a la-
bel from a ﬁxed set of user-deﬁned labels to the current alert. Then, the system
computes an extra parameter (called classiﬁcation conﬁdence) and presents this clas-
siﬁcation to a human analyst. The analyst’s feedback is used to generate training
examples, used by the learning algorithm to build and update its classiﬁers. After
the training phase, the classiﬁers are used to classify new alerts. To ensure the sta-
bility of the system over time, a sub-sampling technique is applied: regularly, the
system randomly selects n alerts to be forwarded to the analyst instead of processing
them autonomously. This approach relies on the analyst’s ability to classify alerts
properly and on his availability to operate in real-time (otherwise the system will not
be updated in time); we believe that these (demanding) requirements can be con-
sidered acceptable for a signature-based NIDS (where the analyst can easily inspect
both the signature and network packet(s) that triggered the alert), but that it could
be diﬃcult to perform the same analysis with an anomaly-based NIDS. Benchmarks
conducted over the 1999 DARPA data set, using Snort to generate alerts, show an
overall false positive reduction of over 30% (details on single attack protocols are
not given).
It is worth summarizing the main diﬀerences between ALAC and APHRODI-
TE; namely: (a) ALAC does not consider the outgoing traﬃc, and (b) ALAC relies
heavily on the expertise and the presence of an analyst (in APHRODITE, all the
IT specialist has to do is to set the thresholds). Pietraszek and Tanner [34] further
expand the previous work using alert post-processing based on data mining and
machine learning techniques.
Julisch [14] presents a semi-automatic approach for identifying true positives
based on the idea of root cause: an alert root cause is deﬁned as “the reason for which
it occurs”. The author observes that in most environments, it is possible to identify
a small number of highly predominant (and persistent) root causes. Persistent root
causes trigger alert ﬂoods that distract IT specialists from identifying real attacks.
The process presented, based on techniques which discover frequently occurring
episodes in a given sequence (see Mannila et al. [24, 25]), consists of two diﬀerent
steps: the former (called root cause analysis) identiﬁes root causes related to a given
(large) number of alerts. Then, the latter removes spotted root causes and thereby
drastically reduces the future alert rate. Benchmarks conducted on a log trace from
a commercial signature-based NIDS deployed in a real network show a reduction of
87% of root causes. No further details are given about the testing condition, network
topology or traﬃc typology. The work has been further expanded in [16, 15] to
improve the completeness and accuracy of detection algorithm. We cannot compare
directly this approach with APHRODITE because the data used by the author is
private.
116C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we present APHRODITE, an architecture for reducing false positives
both in signature and anomaly-based NIDSes. The core of APHRODITE consists
of an output anomaly detector (OAD), implemented with an anomaly-based NIDS:
when a standard NIDS (be it signature or anomaly-based) monitoring the incoming
traﬃc raises an alert, APHRODITE checks if the communication actually produces
an anomaly in the outgoing traﬃc. In this case (and in another couple of exceptional
situations), the alert is forwarded to the IT specialist, otherwise it is discarded. The
fact that the OAD is anomaly-based (rather than signature-based) allows it to adapt
to the speciﬁc network environment/service, and to work in an unsupervised way
(at least, after the setup).
Benchmarks on the DARPA 1999 data set show that APHRODITE determines
a reduction of false positives between 50% and 100% in most of the cases, and that
it does not introduce any extra false negative.
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15A Detailed results
Figure 2 shows more accurately what happens to the accuracy and completeness of
POSEIDON stand-alone and POSEIDON in combination with APHRODITE when
we modify the threshold of POSEIDON stand-alone (broken line) and when we
modify the threshold of APHRODITE after having ﬁxed that of POSEIDON to the
best value (unbroken line). Here, we concentrate on the SMTP protocol data of the
DARPA 1999 data set and HTTP protocol data from data set B (these protocols
presented the highest false positive rate, allowing more accurate measurements).
(a) SMTP
(b) HTTP
Figure 2: Detection rates for POSEIDON in combination with APHRODITE using
DARPA 1999 data set (SMTP protocol) and data set B (HTTP protocol): the
x-axis and y-axis present false positive rate (packets) and detection rate (attacks
instances) respectively. Is it possible to observe that APHRODITE presents a lower
false positive rate than POSEIDON on every benchmarked protocol, considering the
same detection rate.
16B APHRODITE pseudo code
In this Section we give a semi-formal description of how APHRODITE works.
DATA TYPE
l = length of the longest packet payload
PAYLOAD = array [1..l] of [0..255] /* packet payload */
HOMENET = set of IP addresses /* hosts inside the monitored network */
HOST = RECORD [
address : IP address ∈ N
port : TCP port ∈ N
]
PACKET = RECORD [
source : HOST
destination : HOST
payload : PAYLOAD
]
alert = RECORD [
alert :
−∞ if input IDS is signature − based
value ∈ Real if input IDS is anomaly − based
processed : BOOLEAN /* track a processed alert by the OAD */
true alert : BOOLEAN /* alert is marked as an incident */
counter : Integer /* packets marked as anomalous in a single communication */
]
DATA STRUCTURE
τ ∈ N /* number of packets used for training phase */
oad ∈ IDS /* anomaly-based IDS analyzing outgoing network traﬃc */
out threshold ∈ Real /* threshold used for anomaly detection by OAD */
magnitude threshold ∈ Real /* threshold used to evaluate input alert magnitude */
raising threshold ∈ Integer /* threshold used to evaluate alert-raising packets */
alerts = set of alerts /* alerts received from the NIDS monitoring incoming traﬃc */
INIT PHASE
/* IT specialists set out threshold, magnitude threshold and raising threshold values */
17TRAINING PHASE
INPUT:
p : PACKET /* outgoing network packet */
for t := 1t oτ /* ﬁrst, train the OAD with τ samples */
oad.train(p.source.address, p.source.port, p.payload) /* see POSEIDON pseudo code */
end for
TESTING PHASE
INPUT:
p : PACKET /* outgoing network packet */
OUTPUT:
true alerts : set of alerts
for each a ∈ alerts do
/* checks if the packet belongs to a communication
marked as anomalous by the input NIDS */
if (match alert(a, p)=TRUE) then
anomaly score := oad.test(p.source.address, p.source.port, p.payload)
/* tests if the output is anomalous */
if (anomaly score > out threshold) then
a.true alert := TRUE
true alerts.add(a)
end if
a.processed := TRUE
end if
end for
/* exceptions handling */
for each a ∈ alerts do
if (
(a.processed = FALSE ) or /* missing output response */
(a.alert > magnitude threshold) or /* alert magnitude */
(a.counter > raising threshold)/ *number of alarm-raising packets */
) then
a.true alert := TRUE
true alerts.add(a)
a.processed := TRUE
end if
end for
return true alerts
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